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NOTES
CLAIM AND DELIVERY IN SOUTH CAROLINA
An owner of personal property who has been deprived of it
by another has two courses of action available to him. He may
by way of a suit in claim and delivery seek recovery of the chat-
tel in specie; or by means of a suit in conversion, he may seek to
recover the value of the converted article.1 Because in South
Carolina an owner of property may by way of one suit in claim
and delivery obtain the value of his property in the event his
chattel cannot be found,2 both courses of action will be involved
in the following discussion.
I. NATURE AiqD ScoPE
A. Definition and Common Law Background
Claim and delivery is a statutory action which is brought to
determine who has the superior right to the possession of a spe-
cific chattel. 3 In such an action two issues are involved: (1) does
the plaintiff have the right to possession of the property and
(2) did the defendant unlawfully take or detain the property.'
A decision of these issues in the plaintiff's favor would entitle
him to demand both delivery of the property and an award of
damages for the taking and detention.5
Claim and delivery is actually a combination of the old com-
mon law actions of replevin, detinue, and trover.6 As these old
forms of action seem to "rule us from the grave"7 an under-
standing of them is essential to an understanding of the scope of
claim and delivery.
1. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 22 (1955).
2. Moore v. Sanders, 114 S.C. 350, 103 S.E. 589 (1920) ; Casto v. Murray,
470 Ore. 57, 81 Pac. 883 (1905).
3. See United Fabrics Corp. v. Delaney, 241 S.C. 268, 128 S.E2d 111
(1962); Lummus Cotton Gin Co. v. Townsend, 36 F.2d 364 (E.D.S.C. 1929);
77 C.J.S. Replevin § 1 (1952).
4. 77 C.J.S. Replevin § 4 (1952).
5. In the event the property cannot be located, the plaintiff may have to
settle for a money award. However, because the first object of an action in
claim and delivery is to allow the plaintiff to obtain possession of the property
in specie, he should have every opportunity to locate the. property before re-
quiring him to accept the alternative money verdict. Charlotte Barber Supply
Co. v. Branham, 184 S.C. 184, 189, 191 S.E. 891, 893 (1937).
6. Actually trover corresponds more closely with conversion as both are
means of collecting damages equal to the value of the converted property.
Claim and delivery is applicable in such a sense only if the property sought
has been destroyed or lost.
7. PRINcE, Oua CommoN LAW HERITAGE 9 (1959).
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1. Replevin. Replevin originally was used only against one
who had unlawfully "distrained" 8 chattels of the plaintiff.
Under this action the plaintiff upon giving security, thereby
insuring that he would contest the distrainor's righfs, was en-
titled to a return of the goods. Thereafter, this action was
extended to apply to all cases of wrongful taking, regardless
of whether "distraint" was involved.9 Possession of the chattel
was the primary concern of replevin; therefore, the action did
not lie when the plaintiff sought damages or money in lieu of the
property. Furthermore, it did not lie for possession except when
the defendant had acquired possession unlawfuZly.O
2. Detinue. Originally, detinue was the action brought to
recover bailed property. It subsequently lay in cases other than
bailments, as where a seller refused to deliver purchased goods
to the buyer or where the finder of lost property refused to
surrender it to the original owner." Finally, detinue became the
proper action to bring in any case where the defendant "had
come by his possession lawfully, as, for instance, where the owner
of the property . .. demanded its return by one to whom he
had loaned it, and the defendant ... unlawfully refused to
redeliver it."
s2
3. Trover. Actually, trover is the forerunner of an action
for "conversion," rather than claim and delivery. The remedy
afforded by both trover and conversion is a judgement for
damages, not possession. However, since one may seek a money
judgement via claim and delivery if the property sought is not
available, claim and delivery necessarily encompasses some of
the characteristics of trover.13
8. To "distrain" refers to the taking of the property of another as security
for the performance of some obligation. Byers v. Ferguson, 41 Ore. 77, 68
Pac. 5 (1902).
9. See Scotr & SimPsoN, CASES ON Cvm PROCEDURE 87 (1951).
10. For a short discussion of replevin, see PRINcE, OUR CoMuoN LAW
HERITAGE 10 (1959).
11. See SCOTT & SIMPSON, CASES ON CIvIL PROCEDURE 91 (1951).
12. See PRINCE, op. cit. sipra note 7, at 10.
13. In discussing the inclusion of trover and replevin within claim and de-
livery, the court said:
Replevin was an action to recover the possession of specific chattels, to-
gether with damages for their unlawful detention. Trover was an action
for damages arising out of the unlawful conversion of personal property.
In so far as the plaintiffs action sought to recover the possession of the
chattels it partook of the nature of replevin, but in so far as it claimed
the value of the property and damages it resembled the action of trover.
Reynolds v. Philips, 72 S.C. 32, 34, 51 S.E. 523, 524 (1905).
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An action in trover was based on an offense to the owner's
title, as when the defendant had exercised unlawful dominion
over, or "converted" the property of another.14 Trover was avail-
able even when there was no showing of bad faith. For example,
when one purchased goods in good faith from a thief, the right-
ful owner could still recover in trover from the purchaser. 15
B. Property Subject to Claim and Delivery
In order to be recoverable by claim and delivery, the chattel
must meet several requirements. First, though it may be animate
or inanimate,'( the property must be personal rather than real
estate.' 7 Secondly, it must be moveable and capable of identifica-
tion and delivery. "Where the property cannot be identified or
separated so as to be seized in kind, replevin usually will not
lie.1l Thirdly, the property must not be incorporeal, such as
"shares" of stock as compared to stock certificates.' 9 Finally,
claim and delivery will not lie for property that has been de-
stroyed or is otherwise not in existence at the time of the suit. 20
Quite naturally, many different items of property have met
the above requirements and have become subjects of claim and
delivery actions. The following examples depict the scope of
property recoverable by means of claim and delivery.
1. Growing Crops and Timber. In Norwood v. Carter,21 a
sharecropper's growing crops and ginned cotton were seized for
delivery to his landlord. The farmer sought by way of claim and
delivery to get his goods back, but the court held that the unsev-
ered crops were "realty" and, therefore, were not subject to an
action in claim and delivery.2 2 However, severed trees and timber
are personalty and may be the subjects of claim and delivery
actions.
23
14. See PRINCE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 12.
15. In addition to being able to recover from a good faith purchaser, the
rightful owner could ask the jury to return a money judgment equal to the
highest value of the converted property between the time of the taking and
the time of the trial. See PRiNcE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 12-13.
16. See C.J.S. Replevin § 9 (1952).
17. Therefore, to obtain possession of land or fixtures attached thereto or to
enforce delivery of a deed, claim and delivery is not the proper remedy.
18. See C.J.S. Replevin § 9 (1952).
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. 176 S.C. 472, 180 S.E. 453 (1935).
22. However, that growing crops cannot be replevied by way of claim and
delivery does not seem to be the general rule. Timothy v. Hicks, 237 Mo. App.
126, 164 S.W.2d 99 (1942); 77 C.J.S. Replevin § 22 (1952).
23. Cloquet Lumber Co. v. Burns, 207 Fed. 40 (8th Cir. 1913).
[Vol. 1L8
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2. Buildings. Generally, buildings may be replevied only if
they have been severed from the realty.2 4 In the case of Vausse v.
Russe, 2 5 the plaintiff held a leased lot on which he had built a
house. He neglected to pay his rent and the landlord, using the
power of distraint, required the sheriff to seize the plaintiff's
chattels. The officer found no chattels and returned the warrant
as levied on the house. The court held that neither a freehold nor
things affixed to it can be subjects of claim and delivery
actions.2"
3. Documents. Generally, claim and delivery is available for
the recovery of records and other writings such as a corporation's
books,27 insurance policies, 28 architectural plans2 9 and stock cer-
tificates.30 The applicability of claim and delivery to writings
also extends to negotiable instruments.31 A draft,3 2 promissory
note 3 and cheek 34 have all been replevied.
4. Money. Because money cannot be readily identified as a
specific article, claim and delivery will not lie for its return. 5
It therefore follows that claim and delivery is not the proper
remedy for the collection of a debt,36 or to recover money due
on account.37
II. FACTORS PRECEDENT To BRINGING SUIT
Even though the chattel sought is within the scope of replev-
iable property, other factors must be considered before a suit in
claim and delivery can successfully be maintained.
24. Cutter v. Wait, 131 Mich. 508, 91 N.W. 753 (1902) ; Vausse v. Russel,
2 McCord 329 (S.C. 1823).
25. 2 McCord 329 (S.C. 1823).
26. Ibid.
27. See 77 CJ.S. Replevin § 10 (1952).
28. Wiessman v. Weissman, 11 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
29. Parry v. Dener, 117 Colo. 455, 189 P.2d 713 (1948).
30. Somerville Nat'l Bank v. Hornblower, 293 Mass. 363, 199 N.E. 918 (1936).
31. Walter v. Earnhardt, 171 N.C. 731, 88 S.E. 753 (1916); Merrell v.
Springer, 123 Ind. 485, 24 N.E. 258 (1890); Smith v. Eals, 81 Iowa 235, 46
N.W. 1110 (1890); 40 Am. Jura Replevinz § 19 (1943).
32. Smith v. Eals, 81 Iowa 235, 46 N.W. 1110 (1890).
33. First Trust Co. v. Matheson, 187 Minn. 468, 246 N.W. 1 (1932).
34. Whitman v. Kovacs, 89 N.Y.S2d 21 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
35. Eaton v. Blood, 201 Iowa 834, 208 N.W. 508 (1926).
36. Spear v. Arkansas Nat'l Bank, 111 Ark. 29, 163 S.W. 508 (1914).
37. Hewett v. Wester, 72 Fla. 26, 72 So. 462 (1915).
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A. Possession and Demand
In the 1817 case of Byrd v. O'Hanl7O8 the indispensable requi-
site of claim and delivery was stated to be a "clear and unequiv-
ocal possession in the plaintiff."3 9 This in numerous later cases40
was found to mean that in order to bring an action in claim and
delivery, the plaintiff at the time of the commencement of the
action must be entitled to the immediate possession of the prop-
erty in question. Furthermore, the plaintiff cannot recover on
the grounds that his adversary lacks the possession requirement;
he must, instead, recover on the strength of his own title or right
to possession.
4 1
As a second requisite to maintaining an action in claim and
delivery, the plaintiff must make a demand for the return of
the property on the person who is in possession.4 2 The demand
requirement is based on the theory that one who rightfully comes
into possession of a particular chattel will surrender it to the
genuine owner upon demand, and should, therefore, be allowed to
do so before being subjected to a law suit.4 3 It should be noted
that the theory refers to one who "rightfully" comes into posses-
sion; therefore, when the taking by or possession of the defend-
ant is proven to have been wrongful, as when the defendant
converts the plaintiff's goods,44 demand is not necessary. Demand
is similarly unnecessary when the circumstances are such that a
demand, if made, would be futile. A showing of futility may
stem from the defendant's acts or statements concerning the
property before the suit is begun, or from his position at the
trial. Exemplary of the latter would be where, instead of defend-
ing on grounds of lack of demand, the defendant alleges fraud,
sets up title in himself, and proceeds to litigate the merits of
the case.
45
38. 1 Mill Const. 401 (S.C. 1817).
39. Id. at 402.
40. E.g Clerks' Benevolent Union v. Knights of Columbus, 70 S.C. 543, 50
S.E. 206 c1905) ; Holliday v. Poston, 60 S.C. 103, 38 S.E. 449 (1901) ; Kirven
v. Pinckey, 47 S.C. 229, 25 S.E. 202 (1896).
41. Peeples v. Warren, 51 S.C. 560, 29 S.E. 659 (1898). Thus, if the plaintiff
depends for recovery on the fact that the defendant also does not have the right
to possess the chattel, his suit will be lost.
42. Nixon & Wright v. Robinson, 104 S.C. 376, 89 S.E. 320 (1916) ; Harby
& Co. v. Byers Lumber Co., 95 S.C. 33, 78 S.E. 522 (1913); Burkhalter v.
Mitchell, 27 S.C. 240, 3 S.E. 225 (1887); Jones v. Dugan, 1 McCord 428
(S.C. 1821).
43. See 77 C.J.S. Replevin § 64 (1952).
44. 89 S.C. 535, 72 S.E. 464 (1911).
45. Nixon & Wright v. Robinson, 104 S.C. 376, 89 SX. 320 (1916).
[Vol.. 18
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B. Jurisdiction and Venue
Because claim and delivery is an action in rem, 46 jurisdiction
depends on the location of the property sought, rather than on
the residence of the defendant. Therefore, in order to maintain a
claim and delivery action in South Carolina, the goods over
which the litigation is concerned must be situated somewhere
within the state.
47
Also of importance in successfully maintaining a claim and
delivery action, is the selection of the proper venue. In South
Carolina according to code section 10-301, 4 8 the particular county
in which the chattel is located is the correct place to bring a
claim and delivery action.49 Furthermore, if the wrong county
is chosen at first, the venue should be changed, by way of a mo-
tion for an order to change the place of trial, to the proper
county wherein the chattel is kept."°
"Jurisdiction" also involves the necessity of acquiring juris-
diction over the person of the defendant by either serving a sum-
mons on him or by obtaining his voluntary appearance in court.5 1
This need for jurisdiction over the person of the defendant would
seem to produce a problem when considered with the dual need
of bringing the action in the county where the property is sit-
uated. What if the defendant and the chattel were in different
counties?. This problem is solved by a consideration of two fac-
tors. On the one hand if the defendant appears in court to con-
test any part of the suit, the court can assume jurisdiction over
him. On the other hand, if he refuses to appear at the trial, on
46. Lummus Cotton Gin Co. v. Towsend, 36 F.2d 364 (E.D.S.C. 1929).
47. Peeple's Nat'l Bank v. Jones, 249 Ky. 468, 61 S.W2d 17 (1933); 77
C.J.S. Replevin § 84 (1952).
48. Actions for the following causes must be tried in the county in which
the subject of the action or some part thereof is situated, subject to the
power of the court to change the place of trial in certain cases . . . (4)
for the recovery of personal property distrained for any cause.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-301 (1962).
It could be noted that actions for "conversion" are not governed by this
section but by S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-303 (1962), which states that actions for
conversion may be brought in any county where the defendant resides regardless
of where the property is located. Williams v. Rollins, 107 S.C. 440, 93 S.E. 1
(1917).
49. Smith v. Thomas, 184 S.C. 498, 193 S.E. 51 (1937); Williams v. Rollins,
107 S.C. 440, 93 S.E. 1 (1917); All v. Williams, 87 S.C. 101, 68 S.E. 1041
(1910).
50. Smith v. Thomas, 184 S.C. 498, 193 S.E. 51 (1937).
51. Florence Trading Corp. v. Rosenberg, 123 F.2d 557 (2d Cir. 1942);
Devonia Discount Corp v. Bianchi, 271 N.Y.S. 413 (Sup. Ct. 1934); 77 C.J.S.
Replevin § 85 (1952).
NoTs19661
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the authority of Em parte Townes, 52 the defendant waives his
right to contest jurisdiction. "A magistrate is not presumed to
know the county where a defendant resides . . If the magis-
trate has made a mistake, the defendant knows and must appear
and state the facts; his failure so to appear . . . warrants the
magistrate to conclude . . . either that the defendant has been
sued in the county of his residence, or that the defendant assents
to the suit in the county named as the venue."58
III. PROCEDURE FOR CLAmi AND DELIVERX AcTiows
An action in claim and delivery is begun, as is any civil suit,
with the service of a complaint. Because the statutory sections5 4
concerning claim and delivery do not specifically command the
service of a complaint, numerous plaintiffs have neglected this
necessary step and thus have lost their right to sue.5 5 Actually
the code sections which have caused the confusion lay down the
procedure, not for carrying out the suit, but for obtaining imme-
diate possession of the property prior to bringing the court
action. 0 Accordingly, if the plaintiff in a claim and delivery
suit is interested in obtaining his goods immediately, he must
follow strictly the procedure prescribed by sections 10-2501
through 10-2516. 57 If he does not desire immediate delivery he
merely serves a summons and complaint and proceeds as he would
for any civil suit.
A. Procedure for Obtaining Immediate Possession
1. Summons. Code section 10-2501 states that "the plaintiff,
in an action to recover the possession of personal property, may,
at the time of issuing the summons, or at any time before answer,
claim the immediate delivery of such property, as provided in
this chapter."58 According to the court's interpretation of this
section, a proceeding to obtain immediate possession of the prop-
52. 97 S.C. 56, 81 S.E. 278 (1914).
53. Id. at 59, 81 S.E. at 279.
54. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-2501 to -2516 (1962), sets forth the mandatory
procedures for claiming immediate delivery of the goods sought in an action of
claim and delivery.
55. E.g., Plowden v. Mack, 217 S.C. 226, 60 S.E.2d 311 (1950) ; Middleton v.
Brown, 202 S.C. 418, 25 S.E.2d 474 (1943) ; Adeimy v. Dleykan, 116 S.C. 159,
107 S.E. 35 (1921).
56. Middleton v. Robinson, 202 S.C. 418, 25 S.E2d 474 (1943).
57. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-2501 to -2516 (1962).
58. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2501 (1962).
[Vol. 18
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erty may not be begun until the summons has been issued.59
Therefore, if the summons is served several days after the seiz-
ure of the property, a mandatory provision of the statute has
not been complied with and the action will fail. 0
2. Affidavit. The second step of the procedure is the drawing
of an "affidavit."61 This document, first of all, must describe
the property that is sought and tell why the plaintiff is entitled
to possess it.62 Secondly, it must state that the defendant wrong-
fully detains the property, and why he so detains it. Next, the
affidavit must show that the property has not been taken for tax
payments or pursuant to other legal processes and, finally, it
must give the actual value of the property.63
The affidavit, even though it contains much information that
a complaint would contain, does not take the place of a complaint
and is not the basis of the plaintiff's cause of action. Several
plaintiffs, as has previously been stated, by confusing the two
documents have failed to file complaints and have, therefore,
forfeited their suits.64
As a final step in regards to the affidavit, the plaintiff may
by an endorsement in writing upon the affidavit, require the
sheriff of the county in which the property claimed may be
59. Plowden v. Mack, 217 S.C. 226, 60 S.E.2d 311 (1950); Pelham v. Ed-
wards, 45 Kan. 547, 26 Pac. 41 (1891).
60. Plowden v. Mack, 217 S.C. 226, 60 S.E.2d 311 (1950).
61. When a delivery is claimed an affidavit must be made by the plaintiff or
by someone on his behalf showing:
(1) That the plaintiff is the owner of the property claimed, particularly
describing it, or is lawfully entitled to the possession thereof by virtue of a
special property therein, the facts in respect to which shall be set forth.
(2) That the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant.
(3) The alleged cause of the detention thereof, according to the affiant's
best knowledge, information and belief;
(4) That the property has not been taken for a tax, assessment or fine
pursuant to a statute or seized under an execution or attachment against
the property of the plaintiff or, if so seized, that it is by statute exempt
from such seizure; and
(5) The actual value of the property.
S.C. CODE Axx. § 10-2503 (1962).
62. Such description enables the officer to identify the property which he is
to seize and to take to the plaintiff. See 77 C.J.S. Replevin § 100 (1952).
63. This statement of value is necessary to aid the court in setting bond and
to determine jurisdiction of the court, if the court's jurisdiction is limited by
the amount involved.
64. Plowden v. Mack, 217 S.C. 226, 60 S.E.2d 311 (1950); Middleton v.
Robinson, 202 S.C. 418, 25 S.E.2d 474 (1943); Adeimy v. Dleyken, 116 S.C.
159, 107 S.E. 35 (1921).
1966]
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located, to take the property from the defendant and to deliver
it to the plaintiff."5
S. Bond. The next major step in a claim and delivery action
is the securing of a "written undertaking" or bond by one or
more sheriff-approved sureties."0 Such sureties, being bound for
double the value of the property, assure the defendant that, if
he prevails, the property will be returned to him together with
such damages as he may be entitled to collect. 67 Obtaining bond
is a mandatory prerequisite to gaining immediate possession of
the property, and without it, the sheriff must leave the chattels
in the possession of the party who holds them.68
4. Seizing the Property. Upon receiving from the plaintiff the
affidavit and bond, the sheriff serves a copy of these papers on
the person in possession of the property.69 He may then take the
property into his possession. If the chattel is concealed, the
sheriff must carefully follow the rules for seizure laid down
by the code.70 He should first publicly demand that the chattel
be handed over to him; if the defendant refuses to do so, the
sheriff may break open the enclosure and take the property into
his possession.
71
65. "The plaintiff may thereupon, by endorsement in writing upon the affi-
davit, require the sheriff of the county in which the property claimed may be
to take the property from the defendant and deliver it to the plaintiff." S.C. CODE
ANN. § 10-2504 (1962).
66. Upon receipt of the affidavit and notice, with a written undertaking
executed by one or more sufficient sureties, approved by the sheriff, to
the effect that they are bound in double the value of the property, as stated
in the affidavit, for the prosecution of the action, for the return of the
property to the defendant, if the return thereof be adjudged, and for
payment to him of such sum as may, for any cause, be recovered against
the plaintiff ... the sheriff shall forthwith take the property described in
the affidavit.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2505 (1962).
67. See 77 C.J.S. Replevin § 103 (1952).
68. South Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Florence Sporting Goods, 241 S.C. 110, 127
S.E.2d 199 (1962).
69. The sheriff shall without delay serve on the defendant a copy of the
affidavit, notice and undertaking, by delivering to him personally, if he
can be found, or to his agent, from whose possession the property is taken,
or, if neither can be found, by leaving them at the usual place of abode
of either, with some person of suitable age and discretion.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2507 (1962).
70. If the property or any part thereof be concealed in a building or enclosure
the sheriff shall publicly demand its delivery. If it be not delivered he
shall cause the building or enclosure to be broken open and take the
property into his possession, and, if necessary, he may call to his aid
the power of his county.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2513 (1962).
71. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2513 (1962).
[Vol. 18
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The sheriff next files the affidavit and notice of his proceed-
ings with the proper clerk of court.7 2 At this point, the defendant
is given three days during which he may give notice to the sheriff
that he does not accept the sureties offered. If he waits longer,
he will be deemed to have waived his objections.73 As a final
step the sheriff keeps the property in a secure place until he
delivers it to the party entitled to possession.7 4
B. Results of Claim and Delivery Actions
1. Judgments of the Court. The type of judgment a court may
hand down in a claim and delivery action is determined by the
South Carolina Code of Laws:
In an action to recover the possession of personal property
judgment for the plaintiff may be for the possession, for the
recovery of possession or for the value thereof in case a
delivery cannot be had and for damages, both punitive and
actual, for the detention.75
Accordingly, a plaintiff may receive either possession of the
property in specie or the value in money of the property if the
chattel cannot be located. Seemingly if the defendant would
rather keep the property, he could intentionally misplace it, and
pay over to the plaintiff the value assessed by the jury.7 6 This
theory has been completely dispelled by Charlotte Barber Supply
Co. v. Branhan.7 7 The court here ruled that "the prevailing party
should have the right and opportunity to first exhaust every
available and appropriate remedy known to the law in an effort
to locate and gain possession of the property in dispute before
72. "The sheriff shall file the notice and affidavit, with his proceedings there-
on, with the clerk of the court in which the action is pending within twentydays after taking the property mentioned therein." S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2508(1962). However, no penalty is imposed for failure to comply with the pro-
visions of this section. Alexander v. Jamison, 56 S.C. 409, 34 S.E. 695 (1900).
73. "[Djefendant may within three days after service of a copy of the affi-
davit and undertaking give notice to the sheriff that he excepts to the sufficiency
of the sureties. If he fails to do so, he shall be deemed to have waived all
objections to them." S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2509 (1962).
74. When the sheriff shall have taken property, as this chapter provides, he
shall keep it in a secure place and deliver it to the party entitled thereto
upon receiving his lawful fees for taking and his necessary expenses for
keeping the property.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2514 (1962).
75. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2516 (1962).
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he should be required to accept the alternative verdict, the value
assessed by the jury."78 By means of this ruling, the court seeks
to preserve the first objective of a claim and delivery action: the
right of a true owner to regain possession of his property in
specie.79
2. Accession and Confusion. The results of a claim and deliv-
ery action become more difficult for the court to determine when
either "accession" or "confusion" is involved. In accession, an
innocent party's goods either are irreparably attached to the
property of another, or are used by another to make an entirely
new product.80 In both cases many jurisdictions have held that
the resulting chattel becomes the property of the owner of the
"principal" goods.81 For example, if a wrongdoer steals the cloth
of another and makes from it a coat, using his own possessions as
accessories, the owner of the principal property, the cloth, be-
comes the owner of the coat. However, if a wrongdoer steals the
paint of another and uses it to paint his house, the wrongdoer
as owner of the house would also become the owner of the paint.
The innocent party in such a case could avoid this result by
bringing in a suit in "conversion" for the value of his converted
property, rather than by bringing a suit in claim and delivery
for possession of his goods. By following the conversion proce-
dure, he would entreat the court to decide, not who has superior
right to the possession of the goods, but to decide what damages
he should receive because his property was converted.82 The
injured party could thereby receive in South Carolina, a judg-
ment equal to the highest value of the converted property be-
tween the time of the taking and the time of the trial.
8 3
"Confusion" involves the intermingling of the goods of two
or more owners. Each person's goods retain the original shape
and characteristics, but, due to the intermingling, the goods can
no longer be identified, separated or returned to the original
owner.8 4 Examples of confused goods are grain, oil and mineral
ores which have been stored in a common bin or warehouse.85 The
78. Id. at 189, 191 S.E. at 893.
79. Finley v. Cudd, 42 S.C. 121, 20 S.E. 32 (1894).
80. See BnoWvN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 30 (1955).
81. Kemp-Booth Co. v. Calvin, 84 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1936); Hope Shoe Co.
v. Advance Wood Heel Co., 89 N.H. 178, 195 Atl. 669 (1937) ; Mack v. Snell,
140 N.Y. 193, 35 N.E. 493 (1893).
82. See BROWN, op. cit. supra note 80, § 27.
83. See PRINCE, OUR COMMON LAW HERITAGE 12-13 (1959).
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owner of such intermingled goods depends on the circumstances
involved. First of all, if the goods are of the same kind and
quality, and the amount contributed by each owner is known,
then all owners are entitled to receive portions equal to the
amounts contributed.8 6 However, if the goods are of differing
quality, kind and contributed amounts, the court may solve the
ownership problem by considering who caused the intermingling.
If the confusion occurred with the consent of the owners or
because of an act of nature, all owners become tenants in common
with equal rights and obligations.8 7 If the confusion was caused
by a deliberate or negligent act of one of the parties, many courts
have ruled that, unless the intentional wrongdoer can identify
his goods, he forfeits all right to the confused goods, and the
innocent party becomes the sole owner.8 8 Other courts view this
as a "burden of proof" problem, saying that the aim of the court
is not to punish the wrongdoer, but to obtain redelivery of the
innocent party's goods. However, the difficult task of proving
which goods belong to the innocent party should not fall on his
shoulders, but on those of the wrongdoer. Therefore, if the
wrongdoer cannot prove which amount of the goods belongs to
whom, all of the goods become the property of the innocent
party.
9
3. Damages. Provided he demanded such in his pleading,9 0
the successful party to a claim and delivery action may obtain a
judgment for both punitive and actual damages.91 Actual dam-
ages are allowed in order to repay the prevailing party for the
losses he suffered by being deprived of his property. 2 More
specifically, such damages are allowed to compensate for the
wrongful taking of his property,93 for the detention or holding
of the property,94 and, of course, for the value of the chattel in
86. See BROWN, op. cit. mipra note 80, § 31.
87. Low v. Martin, 18 Ill. 286 (1857); Nowlen v. Colt, 6 Hill 461 (N.Y.
1884).
88. E.g., Union Naval Stores Co. v. United States, 240 U.S. 284 (1916);
Brainard v. Cohn, 8 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1925); Claflin v. Continental Jersey
Works, 85 Ga. 27, 11 S.E. 721 (1890) ; Hall v. Shaffer, 131 Kan. 109, 289 Pac.
442 (1930) ; Levyeau v. Clements, 175 Mass. 376, 56 N.E. 735 (1900).
89. See BROWN, op. cit. supra note 80, § 33.
90. See 77 C.J.S. Replevi; § 262 (1952).
91. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2516 (1962).
92. Hunt v. Cohen, 740 Okla. 248, 179 Pac. 1 (1918); MeMillan Hardware
Co. v. Ross. 24 Okla. 696, 104 Pac. 343 (1909).
93. Ainsworth v. Smith, 157 Miss. 202, 127 So. 771 (1930) ; Jackson v. Mc-
Donald, 115 Mont. 269, 143 P.2d 898 (1943).
94. Sherman v. Williman, 321 Mich. 345, 32 N.W2d 476 (1948); Cook v.
Waldrop, 160 Miss. 862, 133 So. 894 (1931); Smith v. Berlinberg, 302 Pa. 202,
153 Atl. 343 (1931).
1966] NoTs
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol18/iss2/4
SouTu CAiToLqnA LAW REVIEW
the event it cannot be found. 9r The amount of all damages to be
received by the successful party is assessed by the jury, who con-
ceivably may consider the value of the property at the time of
the conversion,"0 depreciation of the property since the time of
the conversion 7 and enhancement of the value of the property
since the time of the conversion.
8
Greenwood Mfg. Co. v. Worley" depicts a claim and delivery
situation wherein the jury may award actual damages. The de-
fendant, Worley, by way of a counterclaim, sought recovery of
goods which the plaintiff had wrongfully taken from the de-
fendant's store. The plaintiff had encouraged the defendant tp
open the store and had furnished him with the goods to offer
for sale. After the defendant had spent much time,- effort and
money in remodeling and stocking the store for business, the
plaintiff repudiated the agreement and took away his goods.
The court held such taking was wrongful and allowed the de-
fendant to recover for all losses involved including the time and
money that he spent preparing the store for business. 100
Punitive damages are allowed in a claim and delivery action
only if there has been a willful taking or willful holding of the
property in question.10 1 South Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Florence
Sporting Goods'0 2 states that such a "willful action" must give
rise to a "reasonable inference of fraud, willfulness, reckless or
conscious disregard"'1 3 of the plaintiff's rights before a verdict
for punitive damages can be given.
IV. CoNCLUSION
Claim and delivery affords South Carolina citizens and their
ever-increasing amounts of "belongings" a valuable source of
protection. Without this action there would be no legal means
whereby one could recover a wrongfully or mistakenly taken
chattel. True, most people carry insurance to assure the return of
95. Steel Motor Service v. Zalke, 212 F2d 856 (6th Cir. 1954); Coulbourn
v. Armstrong, 243 N.C. 663, 91 S.E.2d 912 (1956) ; Moore v. Sanders, 114 S.C.
350, 103 S.E. 589 (1920) ; Myers v. Walker, 173 Wash. 592, 24 P.2d 97 (1933).
96. See 77 C.J.S. Replevin § 270 (1952).
97. See 77 C.J.S. Replevin § 271 (1952).
98. See 77 C.J.S. Replevin § 273 (1952).
99. 222 S.C. 156, 71 S.E.2d 889 (1952).
100. Ibid.
101, Manley v. Bailey, 151 S.C. 366, 149 S.E. 119 (1929).
102, 241 S.C. 110, 127 S.E.2d 199 (1962).
103. Id. at 115, 127 S.E.2d at 201.
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the monetary value of a converted article, but only by way of
an action in claim and delivery may one regain the possession
of the chattel in specie.
It is obvious that a claim and delivery action is superior to
its common law forebears. No longer must a plaintiff decide
before bringing suit whether the taking was wrongful or whether
a return of the property itself or a payment of its value in money
would best meet his needs. Now he must only show that the prop-
erty was taken from him and that he is entitled to possession
of it, and then by way of one suit in claim and delivery seek the
remedy he feels will make him whole.
M]nT& L. GAmsoN
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